The stated purpose of the University Grants Commission (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026 is to eradicate discrimination in higher education. This objective appears in Section 2 of the Regulations. It limits discrimination to specific grounds such as religion, race, gender, place of birth, caste, and disability. It further states that special focus is placed on Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, socially and educationally backward classes, economically weaker sections, and persons with disabilities.
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that the intention to prevent discrimination is constitutionally valid. Articles 14, 15, and 17 of the Constitution of India clearly support equality and the removal of historical disadvantages. However, the concern arises not from the objective itself but from the design, structure, and implementation mechanism of these Regulations.
A significant issue is the absence of any express reference to the General Category. This omission is not accidental. Under Indian constitutional law, the General Category is not recognised as a disadvantaged class. Therefore, naming it would contradict the logic of affirmative action. If the Regulation had attempted to grant special protection to the General Category as a class, it would have violated the principle of reasonable classification under Article 14. Such an act could fall under the Doctrine of Colourable Legislation, which applies when a law appears to pursue a valid objective but indirectly does something the Constitution does not permit. In that sense, the exclusion of the General Category is constitutionally consistent.
However, while constitutionally aligned, this drafting choice creates a psychological imbalance. By explicitly naming only historically protected groups and never naming others, the Regulation silently constructs a narrative where discrimination is assumed to flow in one direction. Law does not operate only on text. It also operates on perception. This asymmetry becomes important when we examine enforcement provisions.
The definition of discrimination in Section 3(e) includes both explicit and implicit discrimination. Explicit discrimination is easy to identify. Implicit discrimination is not. It depends on inference, context, and subjective assessment. There is no measurable standard provided. No burden of proof is defined. No evidentiary threshold is stated. This creates a risk where intent is presumed from perception. In legal systems, such ambiguity is dangerous when safeguards are weak.
This risk is amplified in Section 5, which creates the institutional machinery. Under Section 5(2), the Equal Opportunity Centre is required to coordinate with civil society and local media. The term “civil society” is not defined anywhere in the Regulations or in the General Clauses Act, 1897. This grants excessive discretion to institutions. Coordination with local media is even more concerning. Educational disputes should remain internal unless criminality is established. Media involvement risks reputational damage before due process is completed.
Further, Section 5(11) allows the creation of “Equity Squads” that remain mobile and maintain vigil in vulnerable areas. The Regulation does not define their composition, authority, or limits. There is no clarity on what “maintaining vigil” means. Without clear boundaries, this provision risks intruding into privacy and free expression. Vigil without accountability easily turns into surveillance.
Human psychology must be considered here. Scholars such as Philip Zimbardo have demonstrated through experiments that individuals given unchecked authority tend to overstep boundaries. Power, when loosely defined, invites misuse. This is not an allegation against any group. It is a well-documented psychological pattern. Law must account for this reality by building safeguards. These Regulations largely do not.
The confidentiality provisions in Section 7(h) and Section 8(a) protect the identity of the aggrieved person if requested. While victim protection is necessary, the Regulation does not clearly balance this with the respondent’s right to a fair hearing. If identity protection results in the respondent being unable to effectively rebut allegations, the principle of natural justice is compromised.
Finally, the punitive consequences under Section 11 are severe. Derecognition and debarment affect entire institutions, not just offenders. This creates institutional fear and over-compliance. Fear-driven compliance rarely produces justice. It produces silence.
A more proportionate approach could have been adopted. Instead of creating an expansive regulatory structure with vague powers, the UGC could have focused on dedicated awareness campaigns, training programs, and grievance sensitivity workshops. Prevention through education is more effective than prevention through surveillance.
In conclusion, while the Regulations pursue a constitutionally legitimate aim, they suffer from overbreadth, vagueness, and weak procedural safeguards. The danger lies not in their intent but in their execution. Law must restrain power as much as it seeks to correct injustice. Without that balance, even well-meaning regulations risk becoming instruments of misuse.
“This note is an academic and constitutional critique intended for scholarly discussion and does not advocate disobedience of law or hostility towards any group or institution.”
